SAMM.

This is coolbert:

From the Internet web site South Front and thanks to same.

"Mozambique To Finally Get Rid Of Terrorists"

COUNTER-INSURGENCY MOZAMBIQUE. COIN.

[it can be reasonably [?] be suggested that what is occurring in Mozambique resembles more correctly terrorism than insurgency.]

"After years of outrage generated by ISIS-linked extremists in Mozambique, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has finally launched a military mission in the country, SAMIM."

Nations as contributing military forces  or assistance in some form or capacity to include: * Rwanda * Botswana * Angola * Zimbabwe * South Africa  * European Union * Portugal. Rwanda please note not a constituent member of the SADC nor of course is the EU or Portugal..

NONE of this COIN mission I fear going to be easy. SADC has deployed but is the intervention of foreign military forces going to have STAYING-POWER?

That central government in Mozambique their attitude "dicey"?  COIN mission of this type often protracted and very expensive. The insurgents also having a proven ability, resourceful and resilient. Not easy customers to deal with. 

"dicey adjective: RISKY, UNPREDICTABLE"

See this video the Rwandan military as active in Mozambique.

See also previous blog entries [many with additional embedded links] the topic Mozambique:

https://militaryanalysis.blogspot.com/2021/07/rwanda.html

https://militaryanalysis.blogspot.com/2021/06/swahili.html

https://militaryanalysis.blogspot.com/2021/06/marinha-mm.html

coolbert.

TF Albatros.

This coolbert:

The Islamic state combatants [ISIL] laid low. Italian style. And we are the better for it.

"The little known EC-27J JEDI (Jamming and Electronic Defense Instrumentation) aircraft is the only non-American asset flying the Electronic Support and Protection mission in support of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR)"

Five-thousand hours in the air and counting! Great praise due!!

"The EC-27J JEDI is a variant of the successful Leonardo C-27J Spartan military transport aircraft that has been heavily modified to perform Electronic Warfare missions: the aircraft carries an internal JEDI system that is coupled with a tail antenna to to jam the frequency bands used to remotely operate IEDs and UAVs, in order to neutralize them and thus protect personnel on the ground around areas of interest."

Image and article also courtesy "The Aviationist"and David Cenciotti.

See from the wiki entry a description of ELECTRONIC WARFARE. JEDI aircraft also able to control remotely drone UAV.

ALL CREDIT DUE THE ITALIANS AND A BIG THANK YOU. WE MUST NOT DISMISS THE ITALIAN MILITARY!

coolbert.

Polisario.

This is coolbert:

Courtesy the Internet web site Small Wars Journal and the article by Joseph Hammond.

"Polisario Front Renews War in Western Sahara"

"The United States should pay careful attention to the brewing conflict in the Sahara which if left unchecked could contribute to destabilizing forces across North Africa and the Sahel."

HEY, I THOUGHT THESE INSURGENTS [POLISARIO] WERE DEFEATED A LONG TIME AGO! IF NOT AN OUTRIGHT DEFEAT A STEADY TRUCE EVEN IF SHAKY SOMETIMES.

Polisario an African insurgency: "a Sahrawi rebel national liberation movement aiming to end Moroccan presence in the Western Sahara."

Two aspects of the Polisario COIN [counter-insurgency] odd. 1. The building of an enormous sand berm [wall] greatly restricting the cross-border movement of mobile Polisario units. 2. Autopsy of slain insurgents revealing uncircumcised men as combatants. For a part of the world where nearly 100 %  of the population Muslim the presence of such individuals found as most strange. 

Who are these guys?

coolbert.

DAG.

This is coolbert:

Where the Russian mercenary Wagner Group has failed the Dyck Advisory Group [DAG] will not?

More Mozambique stuff. Insurrection succeeding seemingly unchecked. Bad guys unstoppable?

See previous blog entry [with many additional links] the topic the Islamic State insurrection Mozambique.

"Colonel Dyck And The Fight For Northern Mozambique"

Thanks to the Internet web site "Africa Unauthorized and the article by Hannes Wessels large portions of this blog entry copied in entirety and unashamedly so.

DAG now involved in COIN [counter-insurgency] operations Mozambique? Target the Islamic State insurgents. Devoted readers to the blog invited to read the entire article.

According to Colonel Dyck:

“'The stakes are extremely high,' . . . 'but the Mozambique Defence Forces are unprepared and under-resourced and we have to move fast. Some of the atrocities committed are unlike anything I have seen before and I’ve seen a lot of wars, in a lot of different places. The massacre that followed the attack on Quissanga Police Post involved the mutilation of bodies, severing of limbs and we believe the attackers ate some of the body-parts. Despite this barbarism, this enemy is organised, motivated and well equipped. If we don’t get on top of this, it’s going to spread south fast and that will be a catastrophe for the entire region.'”

“We have discovered it’s a nasty mix of old, well organised, criminal networks involved in ivory, rubies and emeralds but the big, billion-dollar business is heroin being moved through the area and distributed north and south. This has now taken on an Islamic face and it’s a highly effective combination with strong external support.”

DAG operating on a "shoe-string" evidently and hardly it seems able to counter the opposition. 

Dyck is operating on a shoe-string. With one helicopter having been shot down and destroyed, he has two Gazelle gun-ships flying, two ‘Bathawk’ microlights with front-guns, an old Allouette armed with 20 mm canon and two fixed wing aircraft. With a total compliment of less than 30 men, he has almost no ground-forces and his intelligence gathering capability is very limited."

HEY, NOBODY EVER SAID THIS WAS GOING TO BE EASY, DID THEY?

coolbert.

OPS K.

This is coolbert:

Read first from the "RETURN of KINGS" Internet website the story of the
South African Koevet counter-guerrilla/counter-terrorist operations during the time of the South African Bush War period. Then see the You Tube video. Mind you the quality of the video not the best nor is the close-captioned translation so very valid.

"THE STORY OF HOW THE SOUTH AFRICAN KOEVOET KILLED THOUSANDS OF COMMUNISTS"

"spoor: noun - - 1: a track, a trail, a scent, or droppings especially of a wild animal. 2: a trace by which the progress of someone or something may be followed."

Koevet hardly a conventional military unit conducting conventional military operations. A quasi-military police unit organized ad hoc and becoming in a grudging manner institutionalized. Trackers in the ancient and venerable manner attempting to "cut-sign" as would the American Indian fighting army in the days of the Old West.

COIN [counter-insurgency] often come to rely on unconventional units such as koevet. Theoreticians such as David Galula having commented on the inadequacy of conventional military forces when engaging the insurgent/terrorist enemy. Ad hoc units such as koevet become the rule rather than the exception.

See additional You Tube video the subject the South African Bush war:

https://militaryanalysis.blogspot.com/2020/07/a-j-venter.html

coolbert.

Underwear.

This is coolbert:

Autopsy! Jihadi! Abu Bakr!

One again thanks to the tip from Freeper:

"Kurdish General: Informant Stole ISIS Leader al-Baghdadi’s Underwear for U.S."

"A Kurdish general [SDF/YPG] revealed Monday that an informant stole the underwear of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to prove to his credibility U.S. intelligence . . . Gen. Mazloum Abdi of the Syrian Democratic Forces, said his intelligence unit had a source who was privy to the layout of al-Baghdadi’s secret compound near the Turkish border."

DNA evidence desirable. Confirm with 100 % assurance that the Caliph is indeed dead. A nasty business but within the realm of counter-insurgency [COIN] that now seems to be standard procedure.

Confirm or deny also the validity of an intelligence source.

Forensics as was reputedly done also on Osama bin Laden. A stool sample obtained. To determine if Osama indeed needed dialysis treatment on a regular basis as an intelligence source has reported. Totally 100 % confirmation to the identity of Osama a plus.

Bona fides in the field of intelligence most important!

coolbert.

BOPE.

This is coolbert:

Blame it on Rio!

In consonance with this prior blog entry some video of BOPE.

Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (BOPE). "Special Police Operations Battalion" Brazil.

Paramilitary special operations type police unit their responsibility the various favela vicinity Rio De Janeiro.

Paramilitary police of the sort as will be needed to secure the dystopian urban areas of the future. Note the future is NOW in many parts of the world beyond Brazil.

Massive and overwhelming use of force hardly enough to combat the lawlessness and misbehavior of those occupying the dystopian urban area. Force first but pacification must also include follow-up operations normally referred to as civic action [issuing government approved ID, providing fresh water, opening medical clinics]. Prevent the criminal element from returning and once more exerting control over the inhabitants of a favela in the Brazilian case.

coolbert.

Mega.

This is coolbert:

Dystopian!

"A dystopia is a community or society that is undesirable or frightening. It is translated as 'bad place' and is an antonym of utopia"

From the tip at the Internet web site Intercept this video a must watch.

I recommend highly without qualification or reservation.

The future is urban and the street gang the greatest threat. That proper combination of money, organization, numbers, weapons and ruthlessness.

Currently in this regard the Brazilian favela street gang most prominent. See previous blog entry [with additional embedded links] as to the para-military threat as posed by the Brazilian street gang:

https://militaryanalysis.blogspot.com/2019/03/3g2-atomic.html

coolbert.

Blimp.

This is coolbert:

Colonel Blimp sir? Gad sir!

British general officers in command of Canadian troops often cited as rather incompetent. Dieppe as an example. And before there was Dieppe there was the Northwest Rebellion. Thanks to the outstanding Internet web site isegoria.net

"Before D-Day, there was Dieppe"

Most specifically from a comment Bruce says:

"Reminiscences of a Bungle, By One of the Bunglers is an excellent military memoir. By a Canadian who was on the expedition that suppressed the 1885 Northwest Rebellion"

"Well, in this book every Canadian in the army hated the British general commanding them. And by extension, the British Empire commanding Canada."

THAT BRITISH GENERAL COMMANDING THE TROOPS SENT TO SUPPRESS THE NORTHWEST REBELLION WE CAN REASONABLY INFER IS THIS MAN:

General Sir Frederick Dobson Middleton.

"General Sir Frederick Dobson Middleton KCMG CB . . . was a British general noted for his service throughout the Empire and particularly in the North-West Rebellion."

"There were also other criticisms of Middleton's command during the rebellion, such as his hesitancy to unleash the Canadian militia troops to assault the Métis positions at Batoche, and unfair treatment and poor maintenance accorded the troops under his command"

Middleton according to the wiki entry a capable combat commander. At the time of the Northwest Rebellion somewhat "elderly", thought to be timid [that word timid in the military sense of the word very pejorative].

Middleton rather think of a man more prudent than timid? In command not of regular army troops but rather militia and volunteer, a motley crew to say the least.

THE REBELLION WAS DEFEATED AFTER ALL. GAD SIR!!

coolbert.

CDN.

This is coolbert:

WARNING: If you are squeamish or easily offended by images of blood and gore of the extreme variety hit ESCAPE now!

From Breitbart, the tip from MiMi and the story by ILDEFONSO ORTIZ and BRANDON DARBY and thanks to same.

"GRAPHIC: Los Zetas Cartel Attacks Mexican Army Fort near Texas Border"

"The ongoing violence between cartel fighters and Mexican authorities in Nuevo Laredo led to 12 gunmen dying within a 24-hour span this week."

Regarding Los Zetas:

"Los Zetas is a Mexican criminal syndicate, regarded as one of the most dangerous of the country's drug cartels. While primarily concerned with drug trafficking, the organization also runs profitable sex trafficking and gun running rackets."

Los Zetas has morphed from a gang of drug smugglers into a para-military style criminal organizxation and apparently this has been for some time.

Openly attacking Mexican military forces and not hesitant to do so. Para-military in that the cartel fighters wear a standard military uniform with battle kit, operate openly, equipped with crew-served and vehicle-mounted heavy weapons apparently to include machine guns of the fifty caliber [12.7 mm] variety.

See prior blog entries, the Brazilian street gangs and their representing a general threat beyond mere drug trafficking.

https://militaryanalysis.blogspot.com/2019/02/3g2-ii.html

https://militaryanalysis.blogspot.com/2019/03/3g2-atomic.html

coolbert.

K.P.S.

This is coolbert:

More lessons learned COIN! Indian style! Counter-insurgency [COIN] Punjab.

Additionally thanks to the South Asian Terrorism Portal [SATP] and the article by K. P. S. Gill.

The Punjab Campaign again! According to K.P.S. Gill:

"The movement [Sikh separatists] for the creation of Khalistan was one of the most virulent terrorist campaigns in the world. Launched in the early 1980s by a group of bigots who discovered their justification in a perversion of the Sikh religious identity, and supported by a gaggle of political opportunists both within the country and abroad, this movement had consumed 21,469 lives before it was comprehensively defeated in 1993."

"Endgame In Punjab: 1988-1993"

DEFICIENCIES AT THE START OF THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN AS IDENTIFIED BY GIL!

"Specifically, the problems that required immediate redress, and the steps taken to tackle them – albeit gradually, and in a process that was often frustrated by the lack of means and support from the political leadership – included"

i. "Inadequacy of the police stations to react to terrorist violence on their own"

ii. "Extremely unfavorable ratio of operational to static and non-productive force in manpower utilization"

iii. "Infiltration of the police by elements sympathetic to the terrorist cause, and deep communal divisions within and between various police and para-military units"

iv. "Near-complete absence of systematic intelligence gathering and analysis"

v. "Absence of a coherent strategy of response to terrorist activity"

vi. "The failure of police leadership"

Once more, those security forces [SF's] of India probably the most proficient and adept in the entire world at COIN. Lots of experience with a well thought out methodology, results speaking for themselves.

coolbert.

Punjab.

This is coolbert:

Lessons learned COIN! Indian style! The Punjab counter-insurgency [COIN].

Courtesy the South Asian Terrorism Portal [SATP] and the article by Anant Mathur

As described by the counter-insurgency expert K. P. S. Gill:

"The movement [Sikh separatists] for the creation of Khalistan was one of the most virulent terrorist campaigns in the world. Launched in the early 1980s by a group of bigots who discovered their justification in a perversion of the Sikh religious identity, and supported by a gaggle of political opportunists both within the country and abroad, this movement had consumed 21,469 lives before it was comprehensively defeated in 1993"

"Secrets of COIN Success Lessons from the Punjab Campaign"

"The Punjab campaign stands out among the most  recent, successful and victorious COIN  campaigns in the world. This was largely made possible by a coherent grand strategy and tactical innovations on the ground. This campaign provides interesting lessons that are applicable to all COIN [counter-insurgency]campaigns."

* "First, the importance of promoting an anti-insurgency leader needs greater emphasis than observed in available COIN theories."

* "Secondly, it is essential that Governments must demonstrate the resolve for a political solution of the conflict only from a position of strength."

* "Thirdly, election of insurgents for constitutional posts creates even bigger problems for the COIN campaign."

* Fourthly, COIN campaigns are inherently labour intensive.

* "Fifthly, cutting-edge technology has a limited role to play in COIN campaigns."

* "Sixthly, the insurgency’s sympathizers in the SFs [security forces] should be handled sensitively."

* "Seventh, the COIN campaign should focus on the leaders and ideologues of the insurgency."

* "Eighth, external help to the insurgency must be stifled using all instruments of state power."

* "Lastly, the campaign must develop specific measures of effectiveness to gauge the level of popular support."

The security forces [SF's] of India more experienced and adept at COIN operations beyond that of any other nation on the planet. 

The Punjab Campaign just one example among many!

coolbert.

J & K.

This is coolbert:

Lessons learned COIN! Counter-insurgency, Indian style.

As extracted from the Internet article in the nutshell highlights:

"CAMPAIGN IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR"

By MAJ Daniel G. Hodermarsky

"With the majority of U.S. Army operations over the past decade focused on counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, there is value in the study of other contemporary campaigns to increase the Army’s depth of understanding.  India has conducted a COIN campaign in Jammu and Kashmir, also referred to as Kashmir, since 1989 . . . Operating in the context of fighting an insurgency on land disputed between two nuclear powers, India has adapted its operational approach over the conflict’s long history. The long-term commitment to the campaign in Jammu and Kashmir offers the U.S. Army a relevant, contemporary case study on COIN operations"

The U.S. Army can draw four lessons from India’s evolving operational approach.

* "First, India’s actions demonstrate that legitimacy cannot be assumed by the COIN force, but is determined by the populace in question."

* "Second, the campaign demonstrates that the military’s goal should be to work itself into the background, and allow the political factors to retain their primacy. "

* "Third, Kashmir also shows that security under the rule of law requires that security forces are held accountable for their actions, and that this process is as transparent as practical."

* "Finally, the COIN efforts in Kashmir serve as another reminder of the long term commitment required in order to be successful."

The image accompanying this blog entry the flag of the principality of Jammu and Kashmir as it was in 1936 during the British Raj.

coolbert.

MTGM.

This is coolbert:

"That greatest internal threat to the United States the street gang." - - David Hackworth.

 MTGMs =  Military-trained gang members

From decades ago now but even more relevant and extreme the situation.

Street gangs possessing that dangerous combination [as enunciated by Hackworth] of numbers, organization, weapons, money and posing a significant threat to American internal security.

This having been so for some time now also. Not a new phenomenon.

Also the gang EXTREMELY RUTHLESS AND PRACTICED AT RUTHLESSNESS!!

Herewith some links from the Small Wars Journal Internet web site the topic of which is the internal security threat the street gang/military connection. All articles courtesy Carter F. Smith and in the case of  # 1 link add the name of Joshua Harms.

1. "The Threat of Street Gangs, Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs, and Domestic Terrorist/Extremist Groups with Military-Trained Members"

"Military-trained gang members (MTGMs) have been identified in every wartime period for the United States—from the Revolutionary War to the current conflicts."

2. "Gangs and the Military Note 1: The Increased Threat of Third Generation Gangs with Military-Trained Gang Members"

"In an early exploration of the evolution of group violence in its most common form, John Sullivan found the beginning indicators of Third Generation (3GEN) Gangs. 3GEN gangs pose a significant threat to the safety, security, and future of our communities."

"First generation gangs are those considered primarily turf gangs."

"Military-trained gang members (MTGMs) have been identified in every wartime period for the United States—from the Revolutionary War to the current conflicts."

"MTGMs increase the level of dangerousness to the community with their warfighter training and share their ability to remain undetected by law enforcement or members of the community, which allows their organization to thrive and grow unchecked."

3. "Gangs and the Military Note 2: Military-trained Gang Members as Criminal Insurgents"

"Military-trained gang members (MTGMs) have received military training such as tactics, weapons, explosives, or equipment, and the use of distinctive military skills. Gangs with military-trained members often pose an ongoing and persistent military and political threat. At least one tenth of one percent of the U.S. population is an MTGM, and there are between 150,000 and 500,000 MTGMs."

"Hail almighty Blackstone!" Chicago street gang slogan from the era of the 1960's. Even much more applicable now than it was then.

coolbert.

Punjab.

This is coolbert:

Here with a critique and key points: "Lessons from the Punjab Campaign".

As extracted from the South Asian Terrorism Portal and thanks to same!

The Punjab insurgency a rebellion by Sikh separatists seeking an independent nation. Defeat of the ten-year long insurgency due to a variety of factors.

SF = Security Forces. COIN - Counter-Insurgency.

"Secrets of COIN Success Lessons from the Punjab Campaign"

By Anant Mathur

 "The Punjab campaign stands out among the most recent, successful and victorious COIN campaigns in the world. This was largely made possible by a coherent grand strategy and tactical innovations on the ground. This campaign provides interesting lessons that are applicable to all COIN campaigns."

* "First, the importance of promoting an anti-insurgency leader needs greater emphasis than observed in available COIN theories."

* "Secondly, it is essential that Governments must demonstrate the resolve for a political solution of the conflict only from a position of strength."

* "Thirdly, election of insurgents for constitutional posts creates even bigger problems for the COIN campaign."

* "Fourthly, COIN campaigns are inherently labour intensive."

* "Fifthly, cutting-edge technology has a limited role to play in COIN campaigns."

* "Sixthly, the insurgency’s sympathizers in the SFs should be handled sensitively."

* "Seventhly, the COIN campaign should focus on the leaders and ideologues of the insurgency."

* "Eighthly, external help to the insurgency must be stifled using all instruments of state power."

* "Lastly, the campaign must develop specific measures of effectiveness to gauge the level of popular support."

The security forces [SF] of India perhaps the most experienced and adept in the world when it comes to counter-insurgency operations, at both the practical and theoretical level.

coolbert.

Oil Spot.

This is coolbert:

Oil spot. Tache d'huile!

"Clear and hold one spot, then expand to another."

That role of the French general officer Gallieni during the Battle of the Marne [1914] well understood.

That military and combat role of Gallieni in those years prior to the Great War perhaps far more important far less understood:

OIL SPOT. A counter-insurgency strategy found to be effective and as first enunciated and put into practice by Gallieni. Suppression of Vietnamese insurgency during that initial period of  French colonial rule in what became French Indo-China.

"The oil spot approach is the concentration of counter-insurgent forces into an expanding, secured zone. The origins of the expression is to be found in its initial use [?] by Marshal Hubert Lyautey, the main theoretician of French colonial warfare and counter-insurgency "strategy."

THERE DOES SEEM TO BE A DEGREE OF CONFUSION THAT PERSON THE ORIGINAL THEORETICIAN OF THE OIL SPOT STRATEGY.

Rather than Gallieni think Lyautey?

"Lyautey adopted and emulated Gallieni's policy of methodical expansion of pacified areas followed by social and economical development (markets, schools and medical centres) to bring about the end of resistance and the cooperation of former insurgents. This method became known as tache d'huile (literally, 'oil stain'), as it resembles oil spots spreading to cover the whole surface."

Oil spot the strategic conceptualization courtesy Gallieni? As put into practice, "emulated" by Lyautey?

Devoted readers to the blog more conversant with the topic let me hear from you.

coolbert.

SGM.

This is coolbert:

SGM = Small Glide Munition.

The decision has been made. Small Glide Munition now authorized to be placed into production and carried by the Air Force AC-130 gunship. Capability of the gunship now significantly enhanced. Other projects of a similar nature [glide-munitions] to be discontinued.

From Zero Hedge and thanks to same.

"Special Ops Getting 1000s Of Small Glide Munitions That Pack A Bigger Punch Than Hellfires"

THE LITTLE MISSILE THAT CAN! SON OF HELLFIRE BUT BETTER!

"As global counter terrorism operations show no signs of slowing down, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are receiving thousands of light, gliding missiles that are smaller and more powerful than an AGM-114 Hellfire and fired from a Lockheed C-130 Hercules above the modern battlefield."

With regard to SGM:
* Slightly over a meter [yard] long.
* About 2/3 of the weight of the SGM devoted to "bang" stuff.

SGM YES and these NO:
* NO Viper Strike.
* NO G-CLAW.
* NO Griffin.

I might well imagine the AC-130 able to carry prodigious numbers of the SGM. And use in a profligate manner as is needed. It cannot get better.

coolbert.

Krim.

This is coolbert:

Of this man and the Rif War I was only the most vaguely familiar with.

Abd el-Krim. Berber insurrectionist waging war against the Spanish and French colonial powers. An amateur, indeed, the archetype of the insurrectionist leader and commander able to formulate grand strategy, strategy, operational art and tactics, wage a guerrilla war and do so quite successfully.

"The Rif War was an armed conflict fought from 1920 to 1927 between the colonial power Spain (later joined by France) and the Berber tribes of the Rif mountainous region. Led by Abd el-Krim, the Riffians at first inflicted several defeats on the Spanish forces by using guerrilla tactics and captured European weapons."

"Abd el-Krim (1882–83 – February 6, 1963) was a Riffian political and military leader. He and his brother Mhemmed led a large-scale revolt by a coalition of Berber-speaking Rif tribes against French and Spanish colonization of the Rif, an area of northern Morocco. The rebels established the short-lived Republic of the Rif. Abd el-Krim's guerrilla tactics influenced Ho Chi Minh, Mao Zedong, and Che Guevara."

Comments:

* Nothing in the early background of Abd el-Krim seems to have prepared him for the role of insurgent and guerrilla leader.

* The Rif War Insurgency only suppressed with the use of massive French military intervention, methods and techniques as employed draconian in nature, including the use of poison gas against civilians.

* Strangely enough too, Abd el-Krim when captured sent to comfortable [?] and prolonged exile not executed or even it seems held captive under excessive duress.

If Ho, Mao and Che all agree that Abd el-Krim the insurgent leader to be emulated, we must do so also? I do think so.

coolbert.

COIN Israel.

This is coolbert:

Military intelligence is an oxymoron? This is so?

"oxymoron - - n. A rhetorical figure in which incongruous or contradictory terms are combined"

Here with the perspective of the retired Israeli intelligence officer Yaakov Amidror regarding the counter-insurgency [COIN] problem.

Consider first the essential elements generally agreed as necessary for an insurgency to succeed:

1. Having a sanctuary to operate from.

2. Having the support of an outside power.

3. Having the support of the people.

NOW to the musings of General Amidror thanks to the Internet web site JCPA.

"Winning Counterinsurgency War: The Israeli Experience"

In the nutshell those elements of a winning counterinsurgency campaign to consist of::

* The decision of the political echelon to defeat terrorism and to bear the political cost of an offensives.

* "Control of the territory from which the terrorists operate."

* "Relevant intelligence."

* "Isolating the territory within which counter-terrorist operations are taking plane."

* "Multi-dimensional cooperation between intelligence and operations."

* "Separating the civilian population that no connection with terrorism from the terrorist entities."

Insurrections generally speaking a response to poor governance!

INSURRECTION AS PERCEIVED BY THE EXPERTS IN MOST INSTANCES THOUGHT TO BE A PROBLEM THE NATURE OF WHICH IS 80 % POLITICAL!

BUT THERE IS A MILITARY SOLUTION IF THE SITUATION PROPERLY ANALYZED AND APPROACHED CORRECT.

So says Yaakov. And when Yaakov speaks, we should all listen?

OXYMORON? WHO SAYS SO?

coolbert.

Patka.

This is coolbert:

I have asked myself the question and so have others. What is that strange looking helmet the Indian Army troops wear?

NOW we have the answer. The patka.

"Patka Helmet-Really An Advanced Combat Helmet"

1. The patka was designed with reasons in mind to include:

* "Patka was made for the SIKH soldiers in the Indian Army (because they had to wear turban alongside and to account for this PATKA was made)". Turban underneath the Patka.

* "Patkas were actually been developed for Sikh soldiers, as they wear their ‘Pagdi’ ( Turban ) always , so initiation was to make such a platform which can be fitted easily inside Turban."

* "The 'strange' head gear that you see in the picture is called 'Patka'. It was evolved keeping in mind the tactical mobility and ballistic requirement of forces engaged in counter-insurgency operations."

* "These patkas are good for counter-terrorism ops but in war they cannot be used, especially if enemy is armed with artillery."

2. As to the protection offered by the patka:

"In terms of protection, the front section of the Patka provides protection against 7.62 x 39mm AK-47 round which is the standard weapon used by militants."

"From all the sides [??] it is highly bullet proof, it can withstand [from the front] a AK-47 from a distance of 25 meters, 9 mm pistol from a distance of 10 meters and so on. [can stop a 9mm round from the side]"

PATKA NOT SUFFICIENT TO PROTEST AGAINST ARTILLERY AND MORTAR INDIRECT FIRE WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AIR-BURST ROUND DETONATING OVERHEAD!

Indian Army troops on actual combat patrol in Kashmir. These are not necessarily Sikhs. The patka is worn by all [?] troops operating in Jammu and Kashmir, most versatile in counter-insurgency operations where indirect weapons fire [with air-burst] is very rare.

Yet one more image of an Indian Army soldier wearing the patka! "Patka helmets are indigenous concept of India to provide a light but effective protection to head. They are those tiny round shaped things usually can be seen with Indian armed personal in J and K [Jammu and Kashmir]. As they are smaller and do not look like typical helmets some time they are called as Head Protective Gear."

NOW you know the rest of the story and as a devoted reader to the blog are so much the better for it too!

coolbert.