This is coolbert:
Continuing and concluding with a critique of the Gallipoli Campaign from the Great War! As from the tip from the Isegoria.net Internet web site.
SO IT SEEMS THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN THE CONCEPT NOT WITHOUT MERIT, WORTHY OF THE ATTEMPT AND TO AN EXTENT BASED ON A PRIOR COMBAT ACTION FROM OVER ONE HUNDRED YEARS PRIOR!
"The War Council thus rightly judged the fragility of Ottoman rule and the ability of military force to contribute to its fall, thus achieving the goal of supporting Russia. There was only one way to use that force, though, and that was to utilize the maritime power of the British to seize the Dardanelles and strike Constantinople."
"In 1807, Royal Navy Admiral Duckworth ran the very same straights, past some of the same forts, and was only stopped short of Constantinople herself by lack of wind. With the advent of steam powered ships, that old enemy would no longer be a factor and the Royal Navy thought that the time was ripe to one-up Duckworth’s exploit."
Those beach landings at Gallipoli also to an extent reminding me of Anzio and what occurred during the Second World War [WW2]. Strategic and tactical surprise having been achieved [to the astonishment of some it seems] and no real effort made to exploit advantage:
"Only two of the landings were being disputed and troops at the other locations had complete freedom of action to attack the Turks on their terms. The most difficult part of an amphibious assault — getting off the beach — was all but accomplished."
"But then the allies stopped. At S Beach, a British battalion was confronted by an overstretched Turkish platoon. But their orders were to get ashore and wait. And so they did. The British commander in charge of Y Beach, where there were no defenders at all, was told to wait for orders to push on. He received no communication of any kind from his higher headquarters for 29 full hours after landing."
THIS QUESTION I POSE TO DEVOTED READERS OF THE BLOG WHO ARE MILITARY GENERAL STAFF GRADUATES OR THOSE MERELY PERUSING THIS WEB SITE IN A CASUAL MANNER:
WHEN FORMULATING PLANS FOR COMBAT OFFENSIVE ACTION, IS PROVISION EVER MADE IN ADVANCE FOR CREATING AND MOVING FORWARD WITH AD HOC MOBILE UNITS TO EXPLOIT A TOTAL AND COMPLETE SURPRISE OF THE ENEMY?