Dien Bien Phu.

This is coolbert:

"Free supplies and open retreat are two essentials

to the safety of an army or a fleet"- - Alfred Thayer Mahan."

"There is much about this famous battle

that seems inexplicable to outsiders,

and we will have to leave a serious

background presentation to analysts

more competent than ourselves."

Here with some interesting articles from different web sites concerning the climactic battle from the First Indo-china War, Dien Bien Phu [DBP].

"'Peace' in a Very Small Place: Dien Bien Phu 50 Years Later"

"Dien Bien Phu – A Fatal Gamble"

"Dien Bien Phu 1954"

DBP considered to be among the thirty most decisive battles of all time?

The story of DBP by now is well-known [?]. French Union forces content to fight an almost strictly defensive battle, NOT prepared for the onslaught of the Viet Minh, defeat from the start [?] being inevitable, the consequences for the French most disastrous, battlefield defeat and an unsuccessful conclusion to the First Indo-China War being the result!

In violation of the dicta of Mahan, the French Union troops at DBP in a quite deliberate manner with premeditation almost malicious in nature being allowed NO LINE OF RETREAT!!

That free flow of supplies [also a dicta of Mahan] as required by the French garrison at DBP also negated!

Both "essentials" gone, the French Union troops were "goners" from the start? This can be undeniably surmised, even by the most casual of observers?

French Union forces at DBP predominantly NOT Frenchmen! Rather consisting of a "mixed force" primarily consisting of:

* French North African colonial troops.
* T'ai troops.
* French Foreign Legion troops.
* Vietnamese National Army troops.

During the period of the First Indo-China War, a French conscript, a draftee, COULD NOT BE COMPELLED TO SERVE in Southeast Asia.

"Frenchmen", as that term is generally, commonly, and ordinarily understood, a distinct minority at DBP, the command structure however, being almost [?] exclusively French!

[T'ai an ethnic group indigenous to Vietnam, not to be confused with the Thai of Thailand! Vietnamese National Army soldiers those Vietnamese loyal to the French, not aligned with the communists.]

From "Dien Bien Phu 50 Years Later" we find an objective analysis of the battle that is more or less correct - - the competent authority and analysis of a man described as: "a retired Army Special Forces officer with service in the 1st and 3rd Special Forces Group". If anyone will know the reasons for French defeat and Viet Minh victory, it would be this man?

According to Bob Seals, French defeat at DBH was due to factors that should have been foreseen and taken into account during planning for CASTOR, but were not. To include:

• "Objective". "There was no agreement on the French side on a 'decisive, obtainable result.'"

• "Mass". "There was insufficient combat power on the French side."

• "Battle positions were not mutually supporting".

• "Insufficient logistics". "The French needed at least 200 tons of supplies a day, Normally only half that amount could be provided."

• "French General Officer leadership". "Cogny (in Hanoi) and Navarre, the Theater Commander in Saigon), were barely on speaking terms during the conduct of the battle and did not work together at all effectively."

• "Terrain and Weather advantage". Vietnamese occupying the high ground, French the low ground! Additionally: "the crachin, or fog and heavy rainfall that characterize the weather in this area of North Vietnam severely complicated French air support"

NO line of retreat at DBH further exacerbated by an additional lack of flow of "free supplies". French Union forces placed in extreme peril without possibility of amelioration to their plight!

A disastrous result that had consequences for almost two decades later!

More on DBH later.

coolbert.