Analysis.

This is coolbert:

"There is much about this famous battle
that seems inexplicable to outsiders,
and we will have to leave a serious
background presentation to analysts
more competent than ourselves."

Back to the subject of Dien Bien Phu [DBP]. My intutive analysis, how "serious" and correct an analysis I leave to the devoted reader of the blog to decide.

1. Na San.

The battle at DBP cannot be properly understood unless considered within the context of Na San.

As understood with an appreciation of Na San, the French plan at DBP was WORTHY?

Na San, one year earlier [1953], the French content with fighting a strictly defensive battle, the results most favorable to the French. Three Viet Minh divisions not able to overcome the "hedgehog" battalion sized strong points surrounding and centered upon an airfield.

Replication of Na San was the main French goal at DBP? Prevail in a similar fashion over the Viet Minh and establish conditions favorable for negotiations which had already been agreed to.

Na San and DBP can be seen as a form of the "strategic defensive". 1. Invade enemy territory. 2. Occupy terrain suitable for the defensive. 3. Present a challenge to the enemy that cannot be refused. 4. Fight a defensive battle, husbanding your forces for an eventual counter-attack!

2. Mass.

French resources and combat effective "mass" as compared to the Viet Minh were lacking?

There was a definite, almost overwhelming [?] disparity of "mass" between the two combatants, everyone agrees in that regard - - but let me suggest that is not the full story.

* Giap successfully employed in an intentional manner FOCUSED and CONCENTRATED energy, both combat infantry and artillery, the French - - dispersing a goodly number their combat effectives - - not employing their troops in an effective and CONCENTRATED MANNER!!

* Four of the nine French strong points were somewhat isolated, THREE OF THOSE FOUR ISOLATED STRONG POINTS DESTROYED ON THE FIRST THREE DAYS OF THE BATTLE, THE DEFENDING UNITS OBLITERATED!!

* A rather significant percentage [2,000 soldiers] of the French Union troops during the battle became what is known as INTERNAL DESERTERS! Merely refused to fight any further, content to sit out the remainder of the battle, non-participants.

* About 500 soldiers of the Vietnamese National Army [those Vietnamese loyal to and fighting with the French] performed so poorly that they were discharged, cashiered on the spot - - stripped of combatant status, given "coolie boy" duties!

* French artillery a DBP was indeed numerically inferior to that of the Viet Minh, and in addition had been incorrectly situated, unable to provide counter-battery/counter-mortar fire.

That "disparity of mass" being exacerbated from a variety of factors, the French not anticipating such eventualities [?], whatever could go wrong - - did go wrong!

3. Leadership.

Bob Seals has spoken that the French Indo-China higher command in Hanoi was not effectual throughout the battle. It SHOULD BE NOTED TOO THAT THE FRENCHCOMMAND WITHIN DBP WAS ALSO INEFFECTUAL.

* De Castries the overall garrison commander two days before the start of the battle began to have misgivings about the entire operation.

* De Castries was only a Colonel, in charge of a divisional size element! A man of such relatively low rank did not possess the sufficient authority to control assets and implement command decisions with the necessary gravitas? This is not clear.

Keep in mind that Na San was commanded by Colonel Gilles, also a relatively low ranking officer. This must be the French way?

Roger Trinquier, while a Major during the First Indo-China war, was in command of GCMA [French Special Forces Indo-China] and had no less than 20,000 "troops" at his beck and call! The French must expect a lot from their officers?

* Piroth the artillery commander and 2nd in command of the French garrison at DBP committed suicide when it was determined that the French counter-battery/counter-mortar fire was not able to silence the Viet Minh artillery.

* Keller the Chief of Staff [CoS] had a mental [nervous] breakdown several days into the battle.

There is even the suggestion that an armed confrontation between de Castries and his combat arms subordinates occurred. De Castries becoming from that moment forward a commander emeritus, no longer having operational command of the garrison and the combat arms elements. This cannot be positively confirmed nor are any of the survivors or witnesses saying if they are still alive.

4. Anti-aircraft-artillery.

Giap at DBP was able to amass an overwhelming amount of firepower - - tube artillery and heavy mortars, ALSO and perhaps even equally important Giap possessing considerable anti-aircraft-artillery [AAA] assets as well.

That airhead that the French had relied upon for supply, casualty evacuation, reinforcement, perhaps even "a line of retreat" became untenable FROM THE START!

* French close-air-support [CAS] at DBP negated to a degree [how much?], no less than thirty "Bearcat" F8F fighter-bombers shot down during the battle. Those "Bearcat" having to fly a distance about one-third further than at Na San just to reach the airspace over DBP.

A fully fueled and laden F8F could not have had much time for "loiter", unable to pick and choose significant targets carefully, AND having to run a gauntlet of again, CONCENTRATED AAA did not stand much of a chance.

* Transport aircraft attempting to air-drop supplies to the DBP garrison because of heavy and effective Viet Minh AAA having to fly at four times the recommended altitude, many of those supply drops ending up in the wrong hands. IF YOU WERE A FRENCHMAN - - THINK NOT JUST FREE SUPPLIES BUT ALMOST NO SUPPLIES!

5. Terrain.

The French in a purposeful fashion occupied the low ground at DBP, the high ground having been conceded to the Viet Minh. Troops placed into a combat situation having to fight from the MOST DISADVANTAGEOUS POSITION! This was PURPOSEFUL? It is almost as if the French were saying: "here we are, go ahead, take a punch, I dare ya'"!

At Na San, the FRENCH DID OCCUPY THE HIGH GROUND, AS IT EXISTED! The French senior commander in all of Indo-China specifically stated in his memoirs that NO OBJECTIONS were ever raised as to the positioning of the strong points at DBP. What are we to make of that?

NO line of retreat NOR free supplies - - the overwhelming concentrated and focused energy of the Viet Minh beyond what the French had experienced at Na San! The French were doomed from the start, unbeknownst to them - - that seems to be clear!

It should be noted that once the forces of Giap encountered the main concentration of French strong points centered around the now-defunct airfield, siege warfare was initiated rather than the Viet Minh continue with mass-wave assault! The French DID fight very bravely and with considerable ability and did inflict very heavy casualties on their Viet Minh adversaries. But in the end it was all for naught!

Of those 10,000 or so French Union troops captured at DBP, only 3,000 emerging alive from POW camp after just FOUR MONTHS of captivity? Very pitiful.

DBP may have been a climactic and one of the most thirty most important battles in history, but consider too that the guns in all of Indo-China did not go completely silent until almost twenty years later! Think about that!

coolbert.