Attack!

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Read this amazing stuff.

First from an interview with the great German aviator of World War Two [WW2] fame, Johannes Steinhoff:

I N T E R V I E W - - LUFTWAFFE EAGLE JOHANNES STEINHOFF - - By Colin D. Heaton

WWII: "From your wide experience, which aircraft was the most difficult to attack?"

Steinhoff: "The B-17 Flying Fortress without a doubt. They flew in defensive boxes, a heavy defensive formation, and with all of their heavy .50-caliber machine guns they were dangerous to approach. We finally adopted the head-on attack . . . but only a few experts could do this successfully, and it took nerves of steel."


And now from the wiki entry for the B-17:

"After examining wrecked B-17s and B-24s, Luftwaffe officers discovered that on average it took around 20 hits with 20 mm (0.79 in) shells fired from the rear to bring them down. Pilots of average ability hit the bombers with only about two percent of the rounds they fired, so to obtain 20 hits, the average pilot had to fire one thousand 20 mm (0.79 in) rounds at a bomber. Early versions of the Fw 190, one of the best German interceptor fighters, were equipped with two 20 mm (0.79 in) MG FF cannons, which carried only 500 rounds, and later with the better Mauser MG 151/20 cannons, which had a longer effective range than the MG FF weapon. The German fighters found that when attacking from the front, where fewer defensive guns were pointed, it only took four or five hits to bring a bomber down. To address the Fw 190's shortcomings, the number of cannons fitted was doubled to four with a corresponding increase in the amount of ammunition carried"

Comments:

* It was not so much that the Luftwaffe pilots were inept as it was more that the B-17 was also a very difficult plane to shoot-down. The plane had a lot of staying power and was able to sustain a lot of damage - - remain in the air and often return to base crew intact!!

* Head-on attack did produce good results but as Johannes states was for experts ONLY and then ONLY those with strong nerves. The USAAF belatedly added a chin-turret to the B-17 to counter the head-on attack when it was realized that the bombers were vulnerable from this sort of encounter.

* Doubling the number of 20 mm cannon on the Fw-190 and incorporating additional ammo only meant that the performance advantage of the super-fast interceptor to a degree was compromised? Perhaps not!

* Those figures of obtaining hits from only 2 % of the rounds fire should not surprise? In modern ground warfare, anti-tank guided-missile gunners who achieve a 95 % accuracy rate in training are only able to hit the target 20 % of the time in real live combat!! When the adrenaline is flowing, your hands are shaking, and you know someone is trying to kill you, it becomes complicated very fast!

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Convoy VII.

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Arctic convoys - - miscellany.

Conclusion.

1. Those sailor in the water either their ship sunk awaiting rescue or already demised [floaters] subjected to attack by the Greenland shark? Normally a shark only living the deepest depths [600 meters or greater] but coming to the surface to scavenge and take advantage of a situation, a food source normally not obtainable. Greenland sharks known to attack warm blooded prey [seals most of the time, humans during the time of the convoys]. Those in the water at the risk drowning, freezing to death, OR BEING EATEN!

2. NAGS detachments [Naval Armed Guard Service] attached to American merchant marine vessels authorized if and when the necessity required, according to their own discretion, to break open a cargo and use what ever war munitions or armaments found to be present and suitable for defense.

3. Soviet light-bomber/heavy fighter Petlyakov Pe-3bis aircraft almost as an afterthought configured for the air defense mission, able to provide air cover for the convoys when in the vicinity and range of Soviet northern airfields and ports.

4. PQ is properly designated and notated as PQ. [Papa Quebec period]. PQ.13, PQ.17, etc. PQ outward bound, QP return.

5. From December 1942 until the end of the war the Arctic convoys referred to as JW [outward bound] and RA [return].

6. There is a certain appeal to naval warfare of the arctic convoy variety period? A clean fight, armed military men against other armed military men, civilians not in the line of fire or involved, damage to civilian property nil to negligible, etc. NO or minimal atrocity, NO shirking your duty, NO distinction between combatant soldier and rear-echelon support troops, etc. Duty of this sort regardless of hazard has a certain attraction for a great many?

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Convoys VI.

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Arctic convoys - - cargo!

It cannot be said of the western allied powers they were stingy in their shipments of war munitions to the Soviets!

For merely the ill-fated PQ.17 convoy ALONE we have an idea of what quantities and types of armaments were sent via the arctic route, albeit a convoy of ships that for the most part did not complete the voyage, more than half sunk!

From the David Irving book: "The Destruction of PQ.17":

"What a cargo for the Russians! What a prize for the enemy! Seven hundred million dollars’ worth of armaments – 297 aircraft, 594 tanks, 4,246 lorries and gun carriers, and over 156,000 tons of general cargo besides – enough to equip an army of fifty thousand men if it ever arrived in Russian ports."

Considering that there were: "42 convoys totalling 813 ships" it would seem reasonable to assume that enough war munitions were shipped during the entire length of the war THROUGH THE ARCTIC ALONE TO EQUIP A SOVIET ARMY OF TWO MILLION MEN!!

Vital war munitions from this one route alone! Recall that two other routes [Persian Corridor and trans-Pacific] also existed and were in simultaneous use throughout the duration of the war.

Many of those merchant vessels also carrying very hazardous cargo, flammable or highly explosive. War munitions not merely gear but "stuff" that can go "bang" in a big way!

American merchant ships those crews paid: "extravagantly paid ($500 a month plus danger-money)" [for the time that was considerable money for a skilled or semi-skilled or even unskilled worker!]! And every penny earned!

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Convoy V.

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Arctic convoys. Gauntlet!

Those allied convoys [PQ.17 the archetype in this particular instance] sailing that route from Icelandic and British ports to Murmansk and Archangel and return under continuous, remorseless, ceaseless and relentless German attack - - a gauntlet consisting of:

1. German U-boats forming a wolf pack [ Ice Devil pack]. Nine boats on station at the sailing of PQ.17, two additional boats " later attached to the for the attack".

* U-88 (Bohmann); * U-251 (Timm); * U-255 (Reche); * U-334 (Siemon); * U-355 (La Baume); * U-376 (Marks); U-408 (von Hymmen); * U-456 (Teichert); * U-457 (Brandenburg). * U-657 (Göllnitz) and * U-703 (Bielfeld).

Nine of those boats actually tallying a "kill" during the attack on PQ.17.

2. German Navy surface vessels, that combination of threat from capital ships in combination with flotillas of destroyers. A naval surface threat as posed to PQ.17 to include:

* Tirpitz. Battleship.
* Hipper. Heavy cruiser.
* "the Fifth and Sixth Destroyer Flotillas"
* Lützow [“pocket-battleship”]
* Scheer  [“pocket-battleship”]
* "the Eighth Destroyer Flotilla"

3. German Air Force [Luftwaffe]. A strike force, that proper tactically tailored combination of horizontal bombers, dive bombers, torpedo bombers augmented by a large contingent of reconnaissance aircraft. This was designated by the German as the Fifth Air Force.

"By the time PQ.17 finally sailed, toward the end of June, the German Air Force had amassed a mighty attacking force of aircraft in the vicinity of North Cape under the commanding general of the Fifth Air Force, Colonel-General Stumpff." An air armada to include:

* "103 twin-engined Junkers 88 bombers"
* "fifteen Heinkel 115 torpedo-bombers on floats"
* "thirty Junkers 87 dive bombers [Stuka]"
* "seventy-four reconnaissance aircraft, including:
    [four-engined Focke-Wulf 200– the “Condor” – the Junkers 88 and the Blohm & Voss 138.]
* "forty-two Heinkel 111 torpedo-bombers"

"Stumpff thus disposed of 264 operational combat aircraft for the strike."

4. Mine fields, friendly and foe. Thanks to the David Irving book: "The Destruction of PQ.17" we have a description of a RETURN convoy [QP.13] which suffered severe damage from AN ALLIED MINEFIELD!

[QP.13 westward bound at the same time PQ.17 eastward bound!]

"half of convoy QP.13 had continued to the United Kingdom, while the other half had just been rounding the 'home stretch' on the west coast of Iceland on 5 July, in a thick fog. Within three minutes the Senior
Officer’s ship and four merchantmen blew up, and two more were seriously damaged in explosions. The convoy had been guided into an Allied minefield off Iceland by mistake."

“At 2040 [5 July], QP.13 and British escorts struck the minefield off the North-West tip of Iceland. O-in-C unable to determine exact location of safe channel. Due to ‘thick’ weather . . . and faulty instruments convoy entered minefield. Ships sunk were: Hybert (US), Massmar (US), Heffron (US), John Randolph (US), Rodina (Rus.), and Niger (Bf.). Ships damaged were: Richard H. Lee (US), Exterminator(Pan.), and Capira (Pan.). All damaged ships were brought to port and repaired."

[PQ.17 did include as an integral part of the convoy mine-sweepers!]

Enemy attack in all cases exacerbated by the horrible and continually wretched climatic condition of the far Arctic north. NO surcease at any time, the strain on ships and crew extreme, those convoys a "cold bear" under all circumstances!! A gauntlet!

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Convoys IV.

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Arctic convoys continued - - intelligence!

"When the chances on both sides are equal, it is

Intelligence that makes one able to look down on

one’s opponent, and which proceeds not by hoping

for the best (a method only valuable in desperate

situations) but by estimating what the facts are,

and thus obtaining a clearer vision of what to

expect." - - Pericles to the Athenians.

The British Royal Navy having access to Ultra intelligence throughout the war and able determine with regularity and accuracy the dispositions of the German naval detachments in Norway, threatening the Arctic convoys, communications intelligence of tremendous value when evaluating the threat as posed to the convoys by the German "gauntlet"!

AND also having access to in an informal manner to the high level message traffic of the German naval most senior command LAND LINE COMMUNICATIONS secured by a cryptographic machine of a higher level of security than Enigma!

German secure land line communications with those naval forces in Norway subject to intercept [wire tapping] by Swedish authorities, the "secure" teleprinter messages of importance "read" - - noteworthy intelligence gleaned and passed to the British as determined by word of mouth and informally!!

These supposedly secure land line encrypted message traffic "read" thanks to the amazing efforts of the famous Swedish cryptanalyst Arne Beurling!!

[Beurling accomplished what he did in two weeks, not having other than message traffic to deal with, NOT having a vast array of analytical machines, a team of analysts, or even having a "peek" at the machine itself!]

The German Geheimfernschreiber secret and supposedly secure on-line cryptographic machine not so secure. The Geheimfernschreiber called Sturgeon by the British!

As to Arne Beurling and his achievement, monumental in nature, we have this excerpt from the wiki:

"In the summer of 1940 he [Beurling] single-handedly deciphered and reverse-engineered an early version of the Siemens and Halske T52 also known as the Geheimfernschreiber (secret teletypewriter) used by Nazi Germany in World War II for sending ciphered messages. The T52 was one of the so-called 'Fish cyphers' and it took Beurling two weeks to solve the problem using paper and pen. Using Beurling's work, a device was created that enabled Sweden to decipher German teleprinter traffic passing through Sweden from Norway on a cable."

"While the Enigma machine was generally used by field units, the T52 was an online machine used by Luftwaffe and German Navy units, which could support the heavy machine, teletypewriter and attendant fixed circuits. It fulfilled a similar role to the Lorenz SZ40 and SZ42 machines in the German Army."

And for the Swedes to violate their neutrality as they did during the war even if informally to the advantage of the allies it was all altruistic and a big thank you is in order? Or the Swedes had more practical reasons for doing what they did? I cannot say for sure.

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Convoys III.

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Sea power. The arctic convoys continued.

It cannot be said that the arctic convoys were sent forth from Icelandic and British ports unarmed, without combat support. Those allied military planners knowing full well in advance that the convoy would inevitably come under attack and be forced to run a gauntlet of German submarines, aerial attack, and perhaps even having to face the presence of large capital ships of the Tirpitz variety!

The danger to the convoys both from the elements and the enemy was extreme and everyone knew this from the start.

Indeed, the naval combat support was considerable just for the PQ 17 convoy alone. Naval combat support to include:

* "The close escort consisted of six destroyers, four corvettes, three minesweepers, four trawlers, two anti-aircraft ships and two submarines." ["defeat attacks by U-boats"]

* "Four cruisers of which two were the American Tuscaloosa and Wichita . . . comprised the close covering force." ["ward off attacks by the Germans' large destroyers and cruisers"]

* "Duke of York, with Washington and Victorious [British aircraft carrier], constituted the distant covering force." [counter to the Tirpitz and assorted pocket battleships]

* "Eight British, one Free French, and four Russian submarines were positioned off the North Cape [Norway] and special air patrols arranged."

"(initially, these [close covering force] also went right through to Russia, but repair facilities at Murmansk were so primitive, and Russian co-operation so grudging, that it was decided that is was not justifiable to risk these valuable ships . . so far to the east, and the covering [close] force was directed to turn back once the convoy had passed Bear Island)"

That close covering force unable to follow the convoys all the way to the destination, the Russian uncooperative and offering minimal and then grudging help when needed. Stalin wanted all that aid and insisted that the Arctic convoys be run all throughout the war, NOT ever at all being helpful to the allied sailors and merchant marine personnel, rather leaving the allies dangling and having to make their own appreciations and plans based upon the paranoia of the dictator.

AND according to David Irving American merchant vessels having an "embedded" NAGS contingent. Naval Armed Guards Service, naval ratings serving on a merchant ship and ready to fight at a moments notice and having at their disposal a four inch gun [100 mm] and various AAA [anti-aircraft-artillery] positions! NAGS personnel again thanks to David Irving at times carrying sidearms in case of a recalcitrant or mutinous crew!

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Convoys II.

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The Arctic convoys - - success!

Those Arctic convoys sailing from Icelandic and British ports, carrying war munitions to the Soviet Union during the Second World War [WW2] are most remembered for the PQ 17 convoy? More than half of the ships in the convoy sunk, disastrous consequences - - defeat on this ONE occasion being remembered more than those many more instances where "goals met", not without pain, no gain without pain, but nonetheless, those number of convoys making the passage to Murmansk or Archangel relatively unscathed an achievement of marked proportions!

Surely when taken in totality the convoys must be considered a success?

Given the record of sailings, those numbers of ships running the German "gauntlet" and delivering their cargo unscathed is rather impressive. The allies did a good job of pushing the convoys through regardless of danger and peril, both during the OUTWARD BOUND VOYAGE AND THE RETURN VOYAGE!!

From Beesly and the book "Very Special Intelligence" we have these figures:

"From August 1941 to May 1945, 42 convoys totalling 813 ships set out for North Russia from Iceland or Great Britain. Three-three ships returned without completing the voyage due to stress of weather or other causes. Of the remaining 780, 60 were sunk by the enemy, but 720 arrived safely at their destinations. The remaining 36 returning convoys lost 27 ships."

Please note that merchant vessels lost both during outward bound missions and return voyages! A gauntlet having to be run regardless of direction!

The destruction of convoy PQ 17 ALONE resulting in the sinking of twenty-four merchant ships, a considerable percentage of those vessels total lost during the almost four full years of arctic convoy sailings!

For your free download of the David Irving book: "The Destruction of Convoy PQ.17" go here!

This book available for free download in either the original [1968] or updated [2009] version.

 "WE HAVE uploaded two versions of this book. The original 1968 edition . . . and a more recent (2009) updated and revised edition, incorporating code breaking and other new materials"

Given the context of inclement weather combined with persistent and almost frenzied German attack [the gauntlet], that number of ships arriving safely at destination [but with one exception] compared to those lost indicates and suggests to me predominantly again success rather than failure. You the devoted reader to the blog make your own calculations.

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