Sunday, November 27, 2011


This is coolbert:

"We in Poland do not know the conception of peace at any price. There is only one thing in the life of men, nations, and States which is above price - and that is honour." - - J. Beck 

Here with some insight into the mental attitude of General Gamelin in those months prior to the start of World War Two [WW2]. Gamelin the overall commander of French forces, making assurances to the Poles that in case of war French military action of an OFFENSIVE nature would be initiated against Germany - - WITHOUT FAIL!

Offensive action that did not occur, Gamelin seemingly having given assurances that he thought were subject to INTERPRETATION! Interpretation to the detriment of the Poles so it seems.

The fate of Poland in 1939 a done deal, that French army possessing more men, more and better tanks, an air force about equal in size and capability to the German Luftwaffe NOT going on the offensive, NOT taking the war to the German as promised by Gamelin!

"Some days [5 May 1939] after the Beck's speech General Tadeusz Kasprzycki, Poland's war minister, went to Paris and during the talks with General Maurice Gamelin, designated for the French supreme commander in case of war, and tried to obtain a commitment that the French army would engage against Germany immediately after an expected attack. It was not until after the war, that Gamelin revealed his anti-Polish feelings. For short, he regarded the Poles for warmongers, who tried to drag France into unpopular war. He promised Kasprzycki, that the French air forces would undertake an action against Germany immediately, whereas land forces would undertake limited offensive operations on the third day of mobilization and would unfold them with bulk forces on the fifteenth day of mobilization. Seven years later he admitted: 'I had accepted a formula, which always could be logically interpreted.'" - - Maurice Gamelin.

Gamelin of which not a whole lot is written in the histories of the Second World War [WW2]. NOT even really a controversial figure, a non-entity really. Gamelin was of course beholden to and at the service of the French politicians, Maurice receiving his orders, instructions, and policy directives from the duly elected political apparatus.

And even when the German offensive [1940] in the Ardennes became apparent, Gamelin hesitant, indecisive and lacking almost totally in any degree of vigor and initiative as is needed by the successful senior commander.

Gamelin did not collaborate with Vichy in the those subsequent to the French surrender [1940] and is deservedly now an obscurity whose name is mentioned hardly even in passing.


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