Thanks to the three part Internet article by Dan Tharp and SOFREP replete with diagrams, drawings and photographs. Thank you Dan!
As identified by Dupuy those three factors eternal and unchanging contributing to battlefield success being:
* Officers are more dynamic and aggressive.
Dynamic as responding better to changing conditions.
* Doctrine, tactics and equipment are more suited to the conditions of combat and the environment.
* Troops perform team tasks better.
Here an excellent example of those three factors at work. From that era of the Rhodesian Bush War the Rhodesian Fire Force concept.
Fire Force a platoon sized infantry on-call unit each man "jump" qualified and having at the instantaneous disposal air force transport and combat fire support. Fire Force normally consisting of:
* Heliborne assault.
* Fixed wing close-air-support [CAS].
* Parachute assault.
That heliborne assault in part consisting of one chopper of which providing both C^3 [command, control, communications] and suppressive fire support. A most senior ranking officer [major] in the command helicopter in control and issuing orders and instructions as the battle develops. Similar to the American Firefly concept of the Vietnam War. That comparative senior ranking officer for a platoon sized element necessitated by the authority as deemed required.
Those paratroopers the "stripped down" soldier to the minimum. Slightly encumbered with gear and ready for battle instantly. Normally jumping with a bare minimum of equipment, that to include the FN FAL rifle and one hundred rounds of ammo in pouches, full canteen, the uniform consisting of running shoes [not boots] running shorts, an undershirt, some web gear and that is that.
These Rhodesian troops over-loaded with equipment? Perhaps on a multi-day mission? Please forgive me for being pedantic and pretending to be the expert but those men should be approaching the chopper from the front at a forty-five degree angle.
Multi-day operations paratroopers on demand their load for an extended mission greater and tailored as needed.
That Rhodesian military espousing and developing an entire and unique doctrine and methodology as established for counter-insurgency [COIN] operations as BEST suited to the totality of conditions.
An enemy unit of squad or platoon size located by intelligence units to include trackers or surveillance teams on the ground, that initial squad heli-lifted to the target area, the mission to engage and pin down the adversary.
That additional two squads of Rhodesian infantry parachuting to a drop zone in the vicinity of the on-going fire fight, able to engage and destroy the insurgents, applying conventional infantry tactics to do so.
SOME OF THOSE RHODESIAN PARATROOPERS MAKING DOZENS OF COMBAT JUMPS, UNPRECEDENTED AND WITHOUT EQUAL!!
Fire Force to the extent as a military measure successful and should be recognized as such, the insurgents however eventually carrying the day, a negotiated settlement bringing an end to the war.
Please note also that I have it on very good authority the insurgent combat element in the Rhodesian Bush War were VERY POORLY TRAINED UNIFORMLY SO!!
Fire Force might not have worked in Vietnam!