Tuesday, May 14, 2013

Case Yellow.

This is coolbert:

"inferiority of numbers, inferiority of equipment, inferiority of methods". - - Gamelin.
"And even when the German offensive [1940] in the Ardennes became apparent, Gamelin hesitant, indecisive and lacking almost totally in any degree of vigor and initiative as is needed by the successful senior commander."

Gamelin the generalissimo of the allied [?] armies during the Battle of France [1940] his lacking in vigor much a surprise and contributing to French defeat.

Gamelin NOT however a traitor or a fascist sympathiser or a man at odds with the Third Republic. Merely that most senior military commander whose ability to respond to dynamics sorely lacking, extremely deficient? This does seem to be the case.

Devoted readers to the blog perhaps know if Gamelin wrote his memoirs or an autobiography or biographies of the man have been written? Questions regarding the comportment of the man during that time of 1940 and his decision making process have been addressed and answered?

The allies did have the resources to counter the German attack as occurred in 1940. Case Yellow [the German operational plan] not without potential deficiencies the allies COULD have taken advantage of.

Events as transpiring during the spring of 1940 indeed surprising the German success totally shocking and not anticipated. Also consider that during the Case Yellow campaign:

1. The allies courtesy of the Belgian had the exact plans of Case Yellow in their possession two months prior to the massive attack through the Ardennes. The operational plan captured intact a slightly modified version of the original followed by the German that spring of 1940 almost without deviation!

2. The allies [French and English] during that whole time of the Battle of France [1940] at least had SOME Enigma crypto machine decrypts available to them. French and British both reading at least SOME of the most secret German radio traffic during the campaign and sharing same between the two allies.

3. As Winterbotham has stated, RAF [Royal Air Force] reconnaissance did in fact detect German armor movement through the Ardennes as outlined in the captured German operational plan. This fact made manifest to Gamelin, the reaction being NO reaction! Surely this would cause concern and some definite suspicions.

4. Trevor Dupuy in his book "Understanding War" devotes an entire chapter to a quick and dirty QJM analysis of the Battle of France. Dupuy argues and makes it quite clear that IF Gamelin had redeployed his troops from behind the Maginot Line in time to that threatened Ardennes sector and had DONE SO IN TIME, disaster could have been averted. The German stopped cold!

That German not stopped cold, rather the opposite, the events most disheartening to the body and soul of France.

But not defeat from treachery or treason, this much should be clear.


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