Thursday, September 11, 2014

Weed!

This is coolbert:

As extracted from a previous blog entry:

"Slow but steady. In small increments.

 BUT SO IT SEEMS ONLY AS LONG AS THEY HAVE GUARANTEED AMERICAN AIR POWER. ALL COMBAT ACTIONS PREDICATED ON THE APPEARANCE OF AMERICAN WARPLANES.

So why does not ISIL need air power? How come? They do just fine with ad hoc amateur units but they don't need air power to make gains?"

Iraqi national army and the Kurdish peshmerga able to fight and defeat ISIL contingents, but ONLY when American air power is guaranteed and present. And this is why?

From an acknowledged authority this response worth considering:

"Good question!  Air power to buck up morale, meaning they have little morale to start with, whereas their enemy, ISIL, does have higher morale.  Can't answer why."

 "I expected much more from  the Kurds . . . But I've read recently that their experience with the Iraq Army and government left them without funds for their portion of the army--done deliberately to weaken the Kurd forces for fear they would be a threat to the existing al Maliki government (they were and are)."  

 "I suspect much of the recent Iraqi Army training was directed to  the parade ground, for instance, resulting in officers abandoning their troops  and the troops surrendering or running away at
first contact with battle experienced professionals coming from Syria, where they'd been fighting (and  weeding out their officers) for six months or a year. (of course a lot of  that issue is related to the commanders appointing officers who are loyal to the  regime's boss, as did al-Maliki and his special segment of the Shias in  Iraq, and that gets right back to weeding out poor officers, doesn't it?)"

"The moral is to the physical as three is to one" - - Napoleon.

ISIL morale very high, sky high indeed, Iraqi and peshmerga morale very low! In a nutshell we have the answer?

coolbert.








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