Saturday, April 13, 2013


This is coolbert:

From that prior blog entry:

"A war 'the likes of which' might very well include the massive use of tactical nuclear weapons."

AND "If the North Koreans used biological and chemical weapons against U.S. troops or South Korean targets, Scott said he would advise the U.S. president to respond with tactical nuclear weapons, provided there were suitable targets".

Regarding the "massive use of tactical nuclear weapons" from we have this excerpt of Trevor Dupuy as originally stated in 1987.

As found in "Understanding War" paragraphs quoted in entirety:

"The most important development, or set of developments [since the end of World War Two], of course, has been in the field of nuclear weapons. While the first such weapons were introduced in the closing day of World War II - - and helped to hasten the end of that war - - they have never been used since and particularly have never been used in tactical combat [my emphasis]."

"The fact that there have been no instances of employment of tactical nuclear weapons in these past forty years years [as written in 1987] supports the argument that such employment is not likely in the proximate future, but no commander can meet his responsibilities to his superiors or to this men unless his combat decisions reflect the ever-present possibility that nuclear weapons might be used against him [we cannot also preclude the possibility of chemical or biological attack]. The nuclear-related context of the his decisions need not necessarily be spelled out at all times, but that context must, at the very least, be deeply rooted in his subconscious as he deals with the dispositions and deployment of subordinate units and individuals. He must not allow himself to be deluded - - as some would suggest - - that nuclear weapons are not significantly different from other weapons, only somewhat more powerful [at least in the tactical sense]. Nor should he be similarly self-deluded by the apparent narrowing of the gap between increasingly smaller yields of nuclear narrowing and the progressive increase in power of so-called conventional weapons [improved conventional munitions]."

"Nuclear weapons differ from conventional weapons not just in power, but in kind [my emphasis]. If their use in tactical battle could be assuredly limited to the fractional kiloton variety, then there might be some validity to the easy assumption that they are merely bigger and better weapons. But any use of even the smallest tactical nuke carries with it the possibility of escalation. Escalation with conventional weapons is relatively finite. Escalation with nuclear weapons has potentialities as close to infinity as the human mind can imagine. Such an eventuality is so far from likely that we can almost ignore it, but since it is possible, it should not be ignored completely."

Trevor Dupuy an experienced combat officer whose branch of service was artillery his understanding of nuclear weaponry perhaps without peer? When Trevor speaks, we all need to listen? Also, however, when General Scott speaks, we should also listen?

With regard to the Korean context, does all this scare you? It ought to!


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