Paper & Pencil I.

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Paper and pencil Japan!

Much has been written about the Ultra secret and the ability of the western allies to "read" the most secret and encrypted radio traffic of German military during World War Two [WW2]. German secret radio messages encrypted by the Enigma cipher machine "read' with more or less impunity by the Polish, French, British and finally the Americans [courtesy of the British!]. Secret radio messages as sent by the higher military command echelons "read" in real-time by the allies, producing  action-able intelligence, a war-winning measure.

Much has also been written about the Japanese Purple cryptographic machine during WW2 and the ability of the allies [British, Americans, Soviets] to "read" again with more or less impunity "secret" and supposedly secure radio traffic of the Japanese foreign ministry - - ambassadorial and diplomatic messages of the highest order, producing in real-time action-able intelligence, a war-winning measure.

Too - -  much has been written about the Japanese enciphered naval codes [i.e. JN-25] as used before and during WW2, read with impunity for the duration of the war by both the Americans and British, high-level operational command radio traffic the "reading" of which produced an abundance of real-time action-able intelligence, a war-winning measure. Enciphered naval codes, code with an additive sequence, NOT a machine cipher!

Far less, a paucity of information, almost absolutely nil even, has been written about the field army ciphers and codes of the Japanese  during WW2. WHAT EXACTLY were the allied radio interceptors and analysts of all nationalities doing during that period of prior to and during the war with regard to Japanese army codes and ciphers remains a mystery? NOT an exact mystery, but nonetheless, the effort made against the cryptographics of the Japanese army in the field seems to be lacking when compared to similar efforts made against the ciphers and codes of the German and even the Japanese diplomatic corps.

The cryptologic effort during WW2 against the Japanese army field ciphers and codes was primarily the responsibility of the Central Bureau? Basically an Australian endeavor with a very strong American adjunct? an effort that did not come into fruition and produce action-able results until 1943?

"Central Bureau did not break any high level Japanese Army codes until mid-1943 with the Water Transport code."

"On 15 January 1944, an Australian patrol . . . discovered . . . the complete cipher library of the Imperial Japanese Army's 20th Division . . . Central Bureau used the captured code books to solve the Japanese Army's main cipher system. This intelligence windfall arrived exactly when MacArthur was most prepared to take advantage of it."

Central Bureau finally make progress into Japanese field army ciphers and codes rather late in the game, the Japanese army preferring and using an enciphered code system in contrast to a MACHINE CIPHER!

"BREAKING OF THE JAPANESE ARMY'S CODES, THE"

Allied cryptologic personnel in the Pacific theatre lacked more than anything else that necessary measure of raw "secure" radio traffic available for examination, evaluation, analysis, "reading"!

From the Chinese Black Chamber by H.O. Yardley we have this entry:

"Long ago I sent wireless operators and Japanese translators with equipment to the fronts, east, north, south. All to no avail. They are too cowardly to remain close enough to the front to intercept long wave messages for study and decipherment . . . We can, of course, receive shortwave messages here in Chungking, but what is needed are front-line dispatches, which, for technical reasons, are sent long wave. Such messages can be heard only near the scene of battle."

Long wave transmissions. Those radio transmissions using the frequencies below the standard medium wave broadcast band frequencies, that is to say, below 550 KHZ NOT short wave [3-30 MHZ]. Radio transmitters as used by the Japanese army in the field using long wave frequencies, very reliable under all conditions but only usually hear-able at shorter distances, several hundred miles at most, and that under the most ideal of conditions. First the Chinese and then the various allied nations active in the Pacific war against the Japanese because of "technical reasons" NOT able to intercept that abundance of radio traffic allowing for swift and sure analysis and decryption of secret messages.

That is all there to it? A mere matter of technology. The radio intercept stations of the allies had to be close to copy the secret radio messages of the Japanese army, encrypted using a two-part code with an additive sequence. The quantity of traffic was for a long time inadequate for careful and discerning analysis to be made? NO more than that?

coolbert.