Submarines VII.

This is coolbert:

Submarine - - Deutschland!

Continuing with extracts from the magazine: "SUBMARINES SINCE 1919" and my comments!

The Battle of the Atlantic is generally accepted and agreed upon by the experts to be the longest battle of the Second World War, and the most contentious. Allied failure would have meant defeat vis-a-vis Nazi Germany. Outright surrender or a negotiated settlement to the disadvantage of the allied powers? So is the perception.

From 1943 onward the German navy "had thrown in the towel" and accepted defeat - - U-boat losses too heavy - - allied losses diminishing - - a critical point, a "tipping point" had been reached and the German high command was well aware of this!

That is not to say that efforts continued to be made to replace the U-boat losses, a total withdrawal from the field of combat [Atlantic Ocean] NEVER conceded!

Efforts, prodigious and to a larger degree successful, the re-building of the U-boat fleet, the adoption of new classes of more potent submarines continued unabated during the war, the German, however, facing some realities that could not be overcome. Realities to include:

1. A manpower shortage. Even if a sufficient number of replacement U-boats COULD have been built, still lacking was the numbers of trained and skilled crews AND TRAINED, SKILLED, AND EXPERIENCED COMMANDERS!

"The territorial ambitions of the Germans now proved their undoing. The Army's need for manpower and the aircraft industry's over-riding demands for strategic materials meant that even if the U-boat programme had been completed it was unlikely that the boats could have been manned . . . At the 1943 rate of U-boat production (25-30 boats per month) this left the Navy short of 200,000 men."

Let me also emphasize not only short of manpower, but short of trained, skilled, and experienced manpower, and also short of those trained, skilled and experienced commanders the initiative and daring of which was sorely needed! Numbers alone are not enough!

2. Technological achievements, such as the schnorkel, rather than giving the German a boost, rather inhibited the very actions that made the German U-boat force so formidable and successful prior to 1943! Commanders, not so experienced and skilled, taking to a submerged posture more often, not pressing home the attack, a much more conservative and less productive approach to combat!

"throughout the rest of 1943 and 199 they lacked the ferocious determination that had characterized thei4r earlier efforts. The schnorchel was partly to blame, for its value was negative rather than positive, while using it, a U-Boat was relatively safe, but she did not have that freedom of movement which she had once enjoyed on the surface."

3. A loss of bases in France from the Normandy invasion onward [1944]. Again, a freedom of movement lost, the lack of facilities and alternative bases a hindrance without remedy!

"The invasion of Normandy in 1944 meant the end of the Biscay and Brittany bases . . . The only area in which U-boats still enjoyed any measure of success was in Northern Norway"

Increased submarine production from 1943 onward on the part of the German would not have meant an alternative ending to the Battle of the Atlantic.

Germany kaput, Doenitz and the high command knowing it to be true!

coolbert.