Monday, April 4, 2022

Based.

This is coolbert:

I think I understand this. But not fully 100 % so.

"Why Russia faces a growing threat to its navy off Ukraine"

From the Washington Examiner the article by Brent D. Sadler  | March 30, 2022.

"Russia hadn’t lost a warship to an attack since World War II. Until last week."

"On Thursday, the Ukrainian navy announced it destroyed a Russian amphibious warship, the Saratov, that was conducting resupply missions in the Ukrainian port of Berdyansk. While the details are fuzzy, it's yet more proof that Russia’s war in Ukraine isn't going well."

"Following the invasion, Turkey invoked the 1936 Montreux Convention and denied entry to all foreign warships not previously based in the Black Sea. What’s there now, and perhaps what Russia can bring by canal from the Caspian Sea, is all the navy Russia will have for this war. Before the invasion, Russia moved warships from around the world to bolster its combat power near Ukraine. In total, 12 large surface and nine amphibious warships massed in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov on Ukraine’s southern coast."

Not "previously based in the Black Sea" means that a portion [how extensive is the question] of the Russian naval contingent currently sailing the Mediterranean will not be allowed to sail through the Bosphorus/Dardanelles/Hellespont during the Ukraine Conflict under any circumstances. Significant Russian naval combat power cannot be brought to bear as might be needed.

See previous blog entries that topic the Russian naval forces Mediterranean:

https://militaryanalysis.blogspot.com/2022/02/steaming.html

https://militaryanalysis.blogspot.com/2022/02/blog-post.html

coolbert.




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