Crete.

This is coolbert:

"the 'absolute and immediate need' for 'reinforcement by sea shipment

of heavy weaponry if the operation is to get ahead at all.'"

The Battle of Crete [1941], is also illustrative of the relative German ineptitude at amphibious operations. The German, lacking a comprehensive and all-encompassing doctrine for amphibious operations during the Second World War [WW2] also during Operation Mercury [the invasion of Crete] unable to reinforce by sea those air-dropped and lightly armed troops of the Fallschirmjaeger, German soldiers on the ground that first day of Mercury finding themselves in desperate circumstances, planned and attempted seaborne reinforcement unobtainable, ineffectual!

The Kriegsmarine, using ad hoc organization and commandeered vessels [primarily Greek fishing vessels, called caiques], both on the second and third day of the battle turned back with losses, NOT able to land either troops or the gear as needed by the German paratroopers.

British warships able to intercept the approaching German flotillas, the Luftwaffe even having gained aerial superiority!

It not being until one week AFTER the battle had begun that the German naval forces were finally, after great effort, able to land TWO TANKS, those vehicles having a minimal role in further combat.

"Despite the dangers posed by roving British naval forces, the German Kriegsmarine had not entirely given up on attempts to ship heavy weapons to the struggling paratroopers."

"Despite the dangers posed by roving British naval forces, the German Kriegsmarine had not entirely given up on attempts to ship heavy weapons to the struggling paratroopers. On 24 May Oberleutnant-zur-See Österlin, who had led the ill-fated Maleme Flotilla, was given the task of transporting [to the battlefield] two Panzer II light tanks . . . Upon nearing the shore on 28 May, the lighter was positioned ahead of the tug and firmly beached . . . and the two tanks rolled ashore."

Well, after a week of effort, two tanks ashore is the best you can do, what more need be said? All that too, with aerial superiority, the Kriegsmarine not having a "best moment" during Mercury!

It should be noted too that the German during that same period was not alone in lacking a comprehensive and all-encompassing doctrine regarding successful amphibious operations, or properly possessing an understanding of same. The Soviet Timoshenko in conversation with the U.S. General Marshall, voiced his opinion that a cross-channel amphibious assault of the Normandy type was NOT much different than an ordinary river crossing, "and why were the western allies dithering?".

coolbert.