Quoting in entirety from Dupuy: "Understanding Defeat". The decision as made by Eisenhower in the late summer of 1944 - - mentioned or alluded to in previous blog entries. The "broad front" strategy a result of that decision! The war in Europe, according to Dupuy, being prolonged FOR ANOTHER EIGHT MONTHS AS A RESULT? The elocution of Dupuy [professional soldier/historian/writer/military analyst] far superior to my feeble efforts.
From Dupuy:
"In the 1944 Battle for France following the Allied breakout from Normandy, Germany was saved from complete defeat by Allied logistical problems, and the Allied operational decisions that had to be made because of that situation. This led to one of the great, still-unresolved controversies of World war II.
There were constraints on the amount of supplies that the Allies could put ashore in France after the breakout from Normandy. This was due to the limits on the artificial [Mulberry[ and permanent (but damaged) port facilities [Cherbourg] in Normandy and to the fact that the foresighted Germans were occupying other ports that the Allies might otherwise have used for logistical purposes Within those constraints, the Allied logistical performance was very efficient.
What could or should be done about the effects these constraints had on Allied operations? General Montgomery, Bradley, and Patton gave their advice (without being asked) to General Eisenhower. Conceptually this advice was the same; specifically it as quite different. Ike was urged to concentrate allocations of scarce fuel and ammunition to a relatively small section of the front - - probably one field army - - to enable that army to strike as rapidly and as deeply as possible through France into Germany. The Germans were close to collapse, these generals told Eisenhower; don't given them a chance to recover. Exploit if possible, they said, to the heart of Germany and the incipient collapse would become an actual collapse, and the war would be won before the end of 1944. Montgomery, of course, thought that the supplies should to one of this British armies; Bradley thought they should go to one of his American armies; Patton thought they should go to his Third Army
Eisenhower, properly respectful of the Germans, was fearful that if such a deep and narrow penetration of Germany were to be attempted, the penetration would be cut off and would lead to an Allied disaster. Also, for political reasons he was reluctant to favor the British over the Americans or vice versa. So he decided on a 'broad front' strategy. Supplies were allocated relatively equitably to all armies along the front and, when fuel for ran out early in September, all armies came to a halt. The pause was only for two or three weeks, but in that time the Germans made a remarkable recover. The subsequent Allied advance was slowed greatly. The Germans were able to mount their great Ardennes offensive, resulting in the Battle of the Bulge. The war dragged on for eight more months.
No one can be for certain either that Eisenhower made the right decision or, on the other hand, that he should have adopted the strategy suggested by Montgomery - - Bradley - - Patton. It is not accurate to say that the Allies were defeated by logistics and the operational decision which the logistical situation imposed upon them. Certainly, however, they were not victorious as a result of the decision Ike made. Furthermore, this historian believes the war probably would have been shortened by four to six months had Ike made the other decision."
There were constraints on the amount of supplies that the Allies could put ashore in France after the breakout from Normandy. This was due to the limits on the artificial [Mulberry[ and permanent (but damaged) port facilities [Cherbourg] in Normandy and to the fact that the foresighted Germans were occupying other ports that the Allies might otherwise have used for logistical purposes Within those constraints, the Allied logistical performance was very efficient.
What could or should be done about the effects these constraints had on Allied operations? General Montgomery, Bradley, and Patton gave their advice (without being asked) to General Eisenhower. Conceptually this advice was the same; specifically it as quite different. Ike was urged to concentrate allocations of scarce fuel and ammunition to a relatively small section of the front - - probably one field army - - to enable that army to strike as rapidly and as deeply as possible through France into Germany. The Germans were close to collapse, these generals told Eisenhower; don't given them a chance to recover. Exploit if possible, they said, to the heart of Germany and the incipient collapse would become an actual collapse, and the war would be won before the end of 1944. Montgomery, of course, thought that the supplies should to one of this British armies; Bradley thought they should go to one of his American armies; Patton thought they should go to his Third Army
Eisenhower, properly respectful of the Germans, was fearful that if such a deep and narrow penetration of Germany were to be attempted, the penetration would be cut off and would lead to an Allied disaster. Also, for political reasons he was reluctant to favor the British over the Americans or vice versa. So he decided on a 'broad front' strategy. Supplies were allocated relatively equitably to all armies along the front and, when fuel for ran out early in September, all armies came to a halt. The pause was only for two or three weeks, but in that time the Germans made a remarkable recover. The subsequent Allied advance was slowed greatly. The Germans were able to mount their great Ardennes offensive, resulting in the Battle of the Bulge. The war dragged on for eight more months.
No one can be for certain either that Eisenhower made the right decision or, on the other hand, that he should have adopted the strategy suggested by Montgomery - - Bradley - - Patton. It is not accurate to say that the Allies were defeated by logistics and the operational decision which the logistical situation imposed upon them. Certainly, however, they were not victorious as a result of the decision Ike made. Furthermore, this historian believes the war probably would have been shortened by four to six months had Ike made the other decision."
Comments:
* Those "artificial and permanent (but damaged) port facilities in Normandy" being Mulberry [artificial] and Cherbourg [natural]! Other port facilities along the French Atlantic coast denied access to the allies, occupied as festungs [fortresses] by the Germans. Cherbourg even when captured the port facility itself badly damaged, repair operations necessitating a month of work!
* Ike had a very healthy respect for the combat command abilities of the German generals. The German was very good during the Second World War at both containing a "breakthrough offensive" and forming ad hoc units that gave a good account of themselves. In specific, one of the most senior German commanders in opposition to the western allies was Model - - noted especially for his ability on repeated occasions to "plug" breakthroughs!
* Ike - - in addition, was very keen on maintaining a very harmonious relationship between the coalition of the western allies. Coalitions normally do not fight well! Napoleon was a master at fighting and defeating coalitions, Eisenhower being the foremost expert in the U.S. Army on the various campaigns of Napoleon and in full knowledge of this fact. Harmony, an even keel, and a lack of discord between primarily the American and English allies was always on the mind of Ike. to have shown favoritism with regard to supply would be a violation of the very "rules" as established by Eisenhower.
I think that Ike [the reputation of the man was that prior to WW2 he was the best staff officer in the U.S. Army] understood very well that plans and concepts - - on paper - - do not ever proceed as originally conceived or intended. TOO many imponderables and "fuzzy" appreciations that even with good intentions go awry for one reason or another.
A great controversy from the era of WW2. Such are the decisions the most senior military commanders have to make in time of war, with all the consequences, for better or worse.
coolbert.
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