Perception.

This is coolbert:

Thanks once more here to Dirk and the Nuclear Vault.

Again with an extract from the interview with the Soviet General Danilevich. Regarding the capability of the Soviet to mobilize their industry for war production during a time of PROTRACTED CONVENTIONAL WAR with the NATO powers. "Tooling-up" for war, industry and manufacturing capacity changing over from a peace-time economy to military production. How easy and how well could this be done?

"Cold War Interviews." - - 1992 Gen-Col. (Ret.) Andrian A. Danilevich.

"A General Staff Officer from 1964 to 1990. Director of the General Staff authors collective that composed and refine, between 1977 and 1986, the top-secret, three-Volume Strategy of Deep Operations"

"The mobilization capacity of the U.S. military industries was estimated to be very high, according to our intelligence sources. . . . Furthermore you have tested mobilization and shifting to war production many times . . . we could never conduct a test of the mobilization readiness of our whole industry. There was one such attempt in which four small plants were tested, and even that experiment was stopped quickly because it hurt production. Therefore the real mobilization readiness of military industry . . . . was never tested."

Well, this is all a surprise? I think the standard thinking during the era of the Cold War was that the Soviets were a "planned" and "centralized" economy that had an enormous advantage over the U.S. when it came to military production and the mobilization of the entire society and industry during a time of war.

NOT only was this perception of Soviet strength and advantage incorrect, but it was the OPPOSITE of reality? The U.S. was strong and the Soviet was weak!

A PROTRACTED CONVENTIONAL WAR - - between the Soviets and the NATO powers WOULD NOT HAVE GONE IN FAVOR OF "BIG RED" - - regardless of what was perceived?

"It isn't so much reality that counts as the perception of reality that counts!" - - J. Jackson.

coolbert.