Tuesday, May 26, 2009

Lessons?

This is coolbert:

“[The Sri Lanka government] did everything a general dreams of. Unfettered resources and no political interference.”


Here from the Chicago Tribune, this last Sunday:

Lessons learned in Sri Lanka’s triumph

The defeat of the Tamil Tigers, the armed fighters of the Eelam insurgency now being crushed, put out of business, the order having been given to lay down their arms, is now a subject of intense scrutiny by experts the world-over.

The strategists, military commanders, governments - - themselves involved in anti-guerrilla, counter-insurgency [COIN] operations, are looking for lessons learned! The final phase of the Sri Lanka counter-insurgency [COIN] is an archetype, a model to follow? Already the experts are identifying the “reasons” and factors why the armed forces of the central government in Colombo were able to finally prevail. And factors have been identified? To include:

* “The Sri Lankan army adopted more mobile tactics, overhauled its intelligence system, promoted young commanders and steadily hemmed in one the world’s most ruthless and innovative rebel movements”

* “the most important factor [?] in ending the stalemate was the political will to do whatever it took [to win].”

* [the size of] “the army grew by 70 % to 180,000 troops.”

* [“with more soldiers”] “the army was able to hit the Tigers on several fronts simultaneously.”

And too, the Sri Lanka government adopted a policy of not allowing collateral damage or injury to civilians impede final progress to ultimate battlefield victory:

* “They were not worried about collateral damage,” . . . 'so in many regards it’s a very difficult model to adopt.'”

Heavy handed and draconian methods usually are considered by the “experts” to be counter-productive in such COIN operations! At this point in the twenty-five years-long conflict, Colombo had made the cold-blooded decision to proceed as was done, regardless of further alienating the Tamil populace.

Again, solutions to the COIN problem are generally thought and accepted to be 80 % political and 20 % military. That the Tiger fighting wing has been brought to oblivion and so decisively is a surprise to many? Defeats of this variety are exceedingly rare in the COIN environment?

coolbert.

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